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ABSTRACT
Roughly one-third of world trade is intrafirm trade. This paper starts by unveiling two systematic
patterns in the volume of intrafirm trade. In a panel of industries, the share of intrafirm imports in
total U.S. imports is significantly higher, the higher the capital intensity of the exporting industry.
In a cross-section of countries, the share of intrafirm imports in total U.S. imports is significantly
higher, the higher the capital-labor ratio of the exporting country. I then show that these patterns can
be rationalized in a theoretical framework that combines a Grossman-Hart-Moore view of the firm
with a Helpman-Krugman view of international trade. In particular, I develop an incomplete-
contracting, property-rights model of the boundaries of the firm, which I then incorporate into a
standard trade model with imperfect competition and product differentiation. The model pins down
the boundaries of multinational firms as well as the international location of production, and it is
shown to predict the patterns of intrafirm trade identified above. Econometric evidence reveals that
the model is consistent with other qualitative and quantitative features of the data.
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pol@mit.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Roughly one-third of world trade is intraﬁrm trade. In 1994, 42.7 percent of the total
volume of U.S. imports of goods took place within the boundaries of multinational
ﬁrms, with the share being 36.3 percent for U.S. exports of goods (Zeile, 1997). In
spite of the clear signiﬁcance of these international ﬂows of goods between aﬃliated
units of multinational ﬁrms, the available empirical studies on intraﬁrm trade provide
little guidance to international trade theorists. In this paper I unveil some novel
patterns exhibited by the volume of U.S. intraﬁrm imports and I argue that these
patterns can be rationalized combining a Grossman-Hart-Moore view of the ﬁrm,
together with a Helpman-Krugman view of international trade.
In a hypothetical world in which ﬁrm boundaries had no bearing on the pattern of
international trade, one would expect only random diﬀerences between the behavior of
the volume of intraﬁrm trade and that of the total volume of trade. In particular, the
share of intraﬁrm trade in total trade would not be expected to correlate signiﬁcantly
with any of the classical determinants of international trade.
Figure 1 provides a ﬁrst illustration of how diﬀerent the real world is from this
hypothetical world. In a panel consisting of 23 manufacturing industries and four
years of data (1987, 1989, 1992, and 1994), the share of intraﬁrm imports in total
U . S .i m p o r t si ss i g n i ﬁcantly higher, the higher the capital intensity in production
of the exporting industry. Figure 1 indicates that ﬁrms in the U.S. tend to import
capital-intensive goods, such as chemical products, within the boundaries of their
ﬁrms, while they tend to import labor-intensive goods, such as textile products, from
unaﬃliated parties.1
Figure 2 unveils a second strong pattern in the share of intraﬁrm imports. In
a cross-section of 28 countries, the share of intraﬁrm imports in total U.S. imports
is signiﬁcantly higher, the higher the capital-labor ratio of the exporting country.
U.S. imports from capital-abundant countries, such as Switzerland, tend to take place
1The pattern in Figure 1 is consistent with Gereﬃ’s (1999) distinction between ‘producer-driven’
and ‘buyer-driven’ international economic networks. The ﬁrst, he writes, is “characteristic of capi-
tal- and technology-intensive industries [...] in which large, usually transnational, manufacturers
play the central roles in coordinating production networks” (p. 41). Conversely, ‘buyer-driven’
networks are common in “labor-intensive, consumer goods industries” and are characterized by
“highly competitive, locally owned, and globally dispersed production systems” (pp. 42-43). The
e m p h a s i si sm yo w n .
1Figure 1: Share of Intraﬁrm U.S. Imports and Relative Factor Intensities
Notes: The Y-axis corresponds to the logarithm of the share of intrafirm imports in total U.S. imports for 23 manufacturing
industries and 4 years: 1987, 1989, 1992, 1994. The X-axis measures the log of that industry’s ratio of capital stock to total
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Figure 2: Share of Intraﬁrm U.S. Imports and Relative Factor Endowments
Notes: The Y-axis corresponds to the logarithm of the share of intrafirm imports in total U.S. imports for 28 exporting
countries in 1992. The X-axis measures the log of the exporting country’s physical capital stock divided by its total number of
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2between aﬃliated units of multinational ﬁrms. Conversely, U.S. imports from capital-
scarce countries, such as Egypt, occur mostly at arm’s length. This second fact
suggests that the well-known predominance of North-North trade in total world trade
is even more pronounced within the intraﬁrm component of trade.2
Why are capital-intensive goods transacted within the boundaries of multinational
ﬁrms, while labor-intensive goods are traded at arm’s length?3 To answer this ques-
tion, I build on the theory of the ﬁrm initially exposited in Coase (1937) and later de-
veloped by Williamson (1985) and Grossman and Hart (1986), by which activities take
place wherever transaction costs are minimized. In particular, I develop a property-
rights model of the boundaries of the ﬁrm in which, in equilibrium, transaction costs
of using the market are increasing in the capital intensity of the imported good.
To explain the cross-country pattern in Figure 2, I embed this partial-equilibrium
framework in a general-equilibrium, factor-proportions model of international trade,
with imperfect competition and product diﬀerentiation, along the lines of Helpman
and Krugman (1985). The model pins down the boundaries of multinational ﬁrms
as well as the international location of production. Bilateral trade ﬂows between
any two countries are uniquely determined and the implied relationship between in-
traﬁrm trade and relative factor endowments is shown to correspond to that in Figure
2. The result naturally follows from the interaction of comparative advantage and
transaction-cost minimization.
In drawing ﬁrm boundaries, I build on the seminal work of Grossman and Hart
(1986). I consider a world of incomplete contracts in which ownership corresponds
to the entitlement of some residual rights of control. When parties undertake non-
contractible, relationship-speciﬁc investments, the allocation of residual rights has a
critical eﬀect on each party’s ex-post outside option, which in turn determines each
party’s ex-ante incentives to invest. Ex-ante eﬃciency (i.e., transaction-cost mini-
2This is consistent with comparisons based on foreign direct investment (FDI) data. In the year
2000, more than 85% of FDI ﬂows occured between developed countries (UNCTAD, 2001), while the
share of North-North trade in total world trade was only roughly 70% (World Trade Organization,
2001).
3At this point, a natural question is whether capital intensity and capital abundance are truly
the crucial factors driving the correlations in Figures 1 and 2. In particular, these patterns could in
principle be driven by other omitted factors. Section 4 will present formal econometric evidence in
favor of the emphasis placed on capital intensity and capital abundance in this paper.
3mization) then dictates that residual rights should be controlled by the party whose
investment contributes most to the value of the relationship.
To explain the higher propensity to integrate in capital-intensive industries, I
extend the framework of Grossman and Hart (1986) by allowing the transferability of
certain investment decisions. In situations in which the default option for one of the
parties (a supplier in the model) is too unfavorable, the allocation of residual rights
may not suﬃce to induce adequate levels of investment. In such situations, I show that
the hold-up problem faced by the party with the weaker bargaining position may be
alleviated by having another party (a ﬁnal-good producer in the model) contribute
to the former’s relationship-speciﬁc investments. Investment-sharing alleviates the
hold-up problem faced by suppliers, but naturally increases the exposure of ﬁnal-good
producers to opportunistic behavior, with the exposure being an increasing function of
the contribution to investment costs. If cost sharing is large enough, ex-ante eﬃciency
is shown to command that residual rights of control, and thus ownership, be assigned
to the ﬁnal-good producer, thus giving rise to vertical integration. Conversely, when
the contribution of the ﬁnal-good producer is relatively minor, the model predicts
outsourcing.
What determines then the extent of cost sharing? Business practices suggest that,
in many situations, investments in physical capital are easier to share than invest-
ments in labor input. Dunning (1993, p. 455-456) describes several cost-sharing
practices of multinational ﬁrms in their relations with independent subcontractors.
Among others, these include provision of used machinery and specialized tools and
equipment, preﬁnancing of machinery and tools, and procurement assistance in ob-
taining capital equipment and raw materials. There is no reference to cost sharing
in labor costs, other than in labor training. Milgrom and Roberts (1993) discuss
the particular example of General Motors, which pays for ﬁrm- and product-speciﬁc
capital equipment needed by their suppliers, even when this equipment is located in
the suppliers’ facilities. Similarly, in his review article on Japanese ﬁrms, Aoki (1990,
p. 25) describes the close connections between ﬁnal-good manufacturers and their
suppliers but writes that “suppliers have considerable autonomy in other respects,
for example in personnel administration”. Even within ﬁrm boundaries, cost sharing
seems to mostly take place when capital investments are involved. In particular, Ta-
4ble 1 indicates that British aﬃliates of U.S.-based multinationals tend to have much
more independence in their employment decisions (e.g., in hiring of workers) than in
their ﬁnancial decisions (e.g., in their choice of capital investment projects).
Table 1. Decision-Making in U.S. based multinationals
%o fB r i t i s ha ﬃliates in which parent inﬂu e n c eo nd e c i s i o ni ss t r o n go rd e c i s i v e
Financial decisions Employment/personnel decisions
Setting of ﬁnancial targets 51 Union recognition 4
Preparation of yearly budget 20 Collective bargaining 1
Acquisition of funds for working capital 44 Wage increases 8
Choice of capital investment projects 33 Numbers employed 13
Financing of investment projects 46 Lay-oﬀs/redundancies 10
Target rate of return on investment 68 Hiring of workers 10
Sale of ﬁxed assets 30 Recruitment of executives 16
Dividend policy 82 Recruitment of senior managers 13
Royalty payments to parent company 82
Source: Dunning (1993, p. 227). Originally from Young, Hood and Hamill (1985).
In this paper, I do not intend to explain why cost sharing is more signiﬁcant in
physical capital investments than in labor input investments. This may be the result
of suppliers having superior local knowledge in hiring workers, or it may be explained
by the fact that managing workers requires a physical presence in the production
plant. Regardless of the source of this asymmetry, the model developed in section 2
shows that if cost sharing is indeed more signiﬁcant in capital-intensive industries,
the propensity to integrate will also be higher in these industries. In order to explain
the trade patterns shown in Figures 1 and 2, I then embed the partial-equilibrium
relationship between ﬁnal-good producers and suppliers into a general-equilibrium
framework with a continuum of goods in each of two industries. In section 3, I open
this economy to international trade, allowing ﬁnal-good producers to obtain inter-
mediate inputs from foreign suppliers. In doing so, I embrace a Helpman-Krugman
view of international trade with imperfect competition and product diﬀerentiation,
by which countries specialize in producing certain varieties of intermediate inputs and
export them worldwide. Trade in capital-intensive intermediate inputs will be trans-
acted within ﬁrm boundaries. Trade in labor-intensive goods will instead take place
at arm’s length. The model solves for bilateral trade ﬂows between any two countries,
5and predicts the share of intraﬁrm imports in total imports to be increasing in the
capital-labor ratio of the exporting country.4 This is the correlation implied by Fig-
ure 2. Moreover, some of the quantitative implications of the model are successfully
tested in section 4.
This paper is related to several branches in the literature. On the one hand,
it is related to previous theoretical studies that have rationalized the existence of
multinational ﬁrms in general-equilibrium models of international trade.5 Helpman’s
(1984) model introduced a distinction between ﬁrm-level and plant-level economies
of scale that has proven crucial in later work. In his model, multinationals arise only
outside the factor price equalization set, when a ﬁrm has an incentive to geograph-
ically separate the capital-intensive production of an intangible asset (headquarter
services) from the more labor-intensive production of goods. Following the work of
Markusen (1984) and Brainard (1997), an alternative branch of the literature has
developed models rationalizing the emergence of multinational ﬁrms in the absence
of factor endowment diﬀerences. In these models, multinationals will exist in equilib-
rium whenever transport costs are high and whenever ﬁrm-speciﬁc economies of scale
are high relative to plant-speciﬁc economies of scale.6,7
These two approaches to the multinational ﬁrm share a common failure to properly
model the crucial issue of internalization. These models can explain why a domestic
ﬁrm might have an incentive to undertake part of its production process abroad, but
they fail to explain why this foreign production will occur within ﬁrm boundaries (i.e.,
within multinationals), rather than through arm’s length subcontracting or licensing.
4This second part of the argument is based on the premise that capital-abundant countries tend to
produce mostly capital-intensive commodities. Romalis (2002) has recently shown that the empirical
evidence is indeed consistent with factor proportions being a key determinant of the structure of
international trade.
5The literature builds on the seminal work of Helpman (1984) and Markusen (1984). For extensive
reviews see Caves (1996) and Markusen and Maskus (2001).
6The intuition for this result is straightforward: when ﬁrm-speciﬁc economies of scale are im-
portant, costs are minimized by undertaking all production within a single ﬁrm. If transport costs
are high and plant-speciﬁc economies of scale are small, then it will be proﬁtable to set up multiple
production plants to service the diﬀerent local markets. Multinationals are thus of the “horizontal
type”.
7Recently, the literature seems to have converged to a “uniﬁed” view of the multinational ﬁrm,
merging the factor-proportions (or “vertical”) approach of Helpman (1984), together with the
“proximity-concentration” trade-oﬀ implicit in Brainard (1997) and others. Markusen and Maskus
(2001) refer to this approach as the “Knowledge-Capital Model” and claim that its predictions are
widely supported by the evidence.
6I nt h es a m ew a yt h a tat h e o r yo ft h eﬁrm based purely on technological considerations
does not constitute a satisfactory theory of the ﬁrm (c.f., Tirole, 1988, Hart, 1995),
a theory of the multinational ﬁrm based solely on economies of scale and transport
costs cannot be satisfactory either. As described above, I will instead set forth a
purely organizational, property-rights model of the multinational ﬁrm. My model
will make no distinction between ﬁrm-speciﬁc and plant-speciﬁc economies of scale.
Furthermore, trade will be costless and factor prices will not diﬀer across countries.
Yet multinationals will emerge in equilibrium, and their implied intraﬁrm trade ﬂows
will match the strong patterns identiﬁed above.
This paper is also related to previous attempts to model the internalization deci-
sion of multinationals ﬁrms. Following the insights from the seminal work of Casson
(1979), Rugman (1981) and others, this literature has constructed models studying
the role of informational asymmetries and knowledge non-excludability in determin-
ing the choice between direct investment and licensing (e.g., Ethier, 1986, Ethier
and Markusen, 1996). Among other things, this paper diﬀers from this literature in
stressing the importance of capital intensity and the allocation of residual rights in
the internalization decision, and perhaps more importantly, in describing and testing
the implications of such a decision for the pattern of intraﬁrm trade.
Finally, this paper is also related to an emerging literature on general-equilibrium
models of industry structure (e.g., McLaren, 2000, Grossman and Helpman, 2002a).
My theoretical framework shares some features with the recent contribution by Gross-
man and Helpman. In their model, however, the costs of transacting inside the ﬁrm
are introduced by having integrated suppliers incur exogenously higher variable costs
(as in Williamson, 1985). More importantly, theirs is a closed-economy model and
therefore does not consider international trade in goods, which of course is central in
my contribution.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the closed-
economy version of the model and studies the role of factor intensity in determining
8Although in this paper I show that a Grossman-Hart-Moore view of the ﬁrm is consistent with
the facts in Figures 1 and 2, neither my theoretical model nor the available empirical evidence is rich
enough to test this view of the ﬁrm against alternative ones. This would be a major undertaking on
its own. See Baker and Hubbard (2002) and Whinston (2002) for more formal treatments of these
issues.
7the equilibrium mode of organization in a given industry. Section 3 describes the
multi-country version of the model and discusses the international location of produc-
tion as well as the implied patterns of intraﬁrm trade. Section 4 presents econometric
evidence supporting the view that both capital intensity and capital abundance are
signiﬁcant factors in explaining the pattern of intraﬁrm U.S. imports. Section 5 con-
cludes. The proofs of the main results are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Closed-Economy Model: Ownership and Cap-
ital Intensity
This section describes the closed-economy version of the model. In section 3 below, I
will reinterpret the equilibrium of this closed economy as that of an integrated world
economy. The features of this equilibrium will then be used to analyze the patterns
of specialization and trade in a world in which the endowments of the integrated
economy are divided up among countries.
2.1 Set-up
Environment Consider a closed economy that employs two factors of production,
capital and labor, to produce a continuum of varieties in two sectors, Y and Z.
Capital and labor are inelastically supplied and freely mobile across sectors. The
economy is inhabited by a unit measure of identical consumers that view the varieties
in each industry as diﬀerentiated. In particular, letting y(i) and z(i) be consumption















where nY (nZ) is the endogenously determined measure of varieties in industry Y
(Z). Consumers allocate a constant share µ ∈ (0,1) of their spending in sector Y and
as h a r e1 − µ in sector Z. The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties in
a given sector, 1/(1 − α), is assumed to be greater than one.
Technology Goods are also diﬀerentiated in the eyes of producers. In particular,
each variety y(i) requires a special and distinct intermediate input which I denote by
8xY(i). Similarly, in sector Z,e a c hv a r i e t yz(i) requires a distinct component xZ(i).
The specialized intermediate input must be of high quality, otherwise the output of
the ﬁnal good is zero. If the input is of high quality, production of the ﬁnal good
requires no further costs and y(i)=xY(i) (or z(i)=xZ(i) in sector Z).
Production of a high-quality intermediate input requires capital and labor. For









,k ∈ {Y,Z} (2)
where Kx,k(i) and Lx,k(i) denote the amount of capital and labor employed in pro-
duction of variety i in industry k ∈ {Y,Z}. I assume that industry Y is more
capital-intensive than industry Z, i.e. 1 ≥ βY > βZ ≥ 0.
Low-quality intermediate inputs can be produced at a negligible cost in both
sectors.
There are also ﬁxed costs associated with the production of an intermediate in-
put. For simplicity, it is assumed that ﬁxed costs in each industry have the same
factor intensity as variable costs, so that the total cost functions are homothetic. In
particular, ﬁxed costs for each variety in industry k ∈ {Y,Z} are frβkw1−βk,w h e r er
is the rental rate of capital and w t h ew a g er a t e .
Firm structure There are two types of producers: ﬁnal-good producers and sup-
pliers of intermediate inputs. Before any investment is made, a ﬁnal-good producer
decides whether it wants to enter a given market, and if so, whether to obtain the
component from a vertically integrated supplier or from a stand-alone supplier. An
integrated supplier is just a division of the ﬁnal-good producer and thus has no con-
trol rights over the amount of input produced. Figuratively, at any point in time
the parent ﬁrm could selectively ﬁre the manager of the supplying division and seize
production. Conversely, a stand-alone supplier does indeed have these residual rights
of control. In Hart and Moore’s (1990) words, in such a case the ﬁnal-good producer
could only “ﬁre” the entire supplying ﬁrm, including its production. Integrated and
non-integrated suppliers diﬀer only in the residual rights they are entitled to, and in
particular both have access to the same technology as speciﬁed in (2).9
9This is in contrast with the transaction-cost literature that usually assumes that integration
leads to an exogenous increase in variable costs (e.g. Williamson, 1985, Grossman and Helpman,
9As discussed in the introduction, a premise of this paper is that investments in
physical capital are easier to share than investments in labor input. To capture
this idea, I assume that while the labor input is necessarily provided by the supplier,
capital expenditures rKx,k(i) are instead transferable, in the sense that the ﬁnal-good
producer can decide whether to let the supplier incur this factor cost too, or rather rent
the capital itself and hand it to the supplier at no charge.10 Irrespective of who bears
their cost, the investments in capital and labor are chosen simultaneously and non-
cooperatively.11 Once a ﬁnal-good producer and its supplier enter the market, they
are locked into the relationship: the investments rKx,k(i) and wLx,k(i) are incurred
upon entry and are useless outside the relationship. In Williamson’s (1985) words, the
initially competitive environment is fundamentally transformed into one of bilateral
monopoly. Regardless of ﬁrm structure and the choice of cost sharing, ﬁxed costs
associated with production of the component are divided as follows: fFrβkw1−βk for
the ﬁnal-good producer and fSrβkw1−βk for the supplier, with fF + fS = f.12
Free entry into each sector ensures zero expected proﬁts for a potential entrant.
To simplify the description of the industry equilibrium, I assume that upon entry
the supplier makes a lump-sum transfer Tk(i) to the ﬁnal-good producer, which can
vary by industry and variety. Ex-ante, there is a large number of identical, potential
suppliers for each variety in each industry, so that competition among these suppliers
2002a).
10Alternatively, one could assume that labor costs are also transferrable, but that their transfer
leads to a signiﬁcant fall in productivity. This fall in productivity could be explained, in an interna-
tional context, by the inability of multinational ﬁrms to cope with idiosyncratic labor markets (c.f.,
Caves, 1996, p. 123).
11The assumption that the ﬁnal-good producer decides between bearing all or none of the capital













(1 − η(βk))(1 − βk)
¶(1−η(βk))(1−βk)
where KF
x,k(i) represents the part of the capital input that is transferable, and where KS
x,k(i) is
inalieanable to the supplier. As long as the elasticity of output with respect to transferable capital is
higher, the higher the capital intensity in production, the same qualitative results would go through.
In particular, as long as βk + η(βk)(1− βk) increases with βk, the model would still predict more
integration in capital-intensive industries (see footnote 24). I follow the simpler speciﬁcation in (2)
because it greatly simpliﬁes the algebra of the general equilibrium.
12Henceforth, I associate a subscript F with the ﬁnal-good producer and a subscript S with the
supplier.
10will make Tk(i) adjust so as to make them break even. The ﬁnal-good producer
chooses the mode of organization so as to maximize its ex-ante proﬁts, which include
the transfer.
Contract Incompleteness The setting is one of incomplete contracts. In partic-
ular, it is assumed that an outside party cannot distinguish between a high-quality
and a low-quality intermediate input. Hence, input suppliers and ﬁnal-good pro-
ducers cannot sign enforceable contracts specifying the purchase of a certain type of
intermediate input for a certain price. If they did, input suppliers would have an
incentive to produce a low-quality input at the lower cost and still cash the same
revenues. I take the existence of contract incompleteness as a fact of life, and will
not complicate the model to relax the informational assumptions needed for this in-
completeness to exist.13 It is equally assumed that no outside party can verify the
amount of ex-ante investments rKx,k(i) and wLx,k(i). If these were veriﬁable, then
ﬁnal-good producers and suppliers could contract on them, and the cost-reducing
beneﬁt of producing a low-quality input would disappear. For the same reason, it
is assumed that the parties cannot write contracts contingent on the volume of sale
revenues obtained when the ﬁnal good is sold. Following Grossman and Hart (1986),
the only contractibles ex-ante are the allocation of residual rights and the transfer
Tk(i) between the parties.14
If the supplier incurs all variable costs, the contract incompleteness gives rise to
a standard hold-up problem. The ﬁnal-good producer will want to renegotiate the
price after xk(i) has been produced, since at this point the intermediate input is
useless outside the relationship. Foreseeing this renegotiation, the input supplier will
13From the work of Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994), Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995) and oth-
ers, it is well-known that allowing for speciﬁc-performance contracts can lead, under certain circum-
stances, to eﬃcient ex-ante relationship-speciﬁc investments. Che and Hausch (1997) have shown,
however, that when ex-ante investments are cooperative (in the sense, that one party’s investment
beneﬁts the other party), speciﬁc-performance contracts may not lead to ﬁrst-best investment levels
and may actually have no value.
14The assumption of non-contractibility of ex-ante investments could be relaxed to a case of partial
contractibility. I have investigated an extension of the model in which production requires both
contractible and non-contractible investments. If the marginal cost of non-contractible investments
is increasing in the amount of contractible investments, the ability to set the contractible investments
in the ex-ante contract is not suﬃcient to solve the underinvestment problem discussed below, and
the model delivers results analogous to the ones discussed in the main text.
11undertake suboptimal investments. The severity of the underinvestment problem is
directly related to how weak the supplier’s bargaining power is ex-post.
If the ﬁnal-good producer shares capital expenditures with the supplier, the hold-
up problem becomes two-sided. Because the investment in capital is also speciﬁc
to the pair, the ﬁnal-good producer is equally locked in the relationship, and thus
its investment in capital will also tend to be suboptimal, with the extent of the
underinvestment being inversely related to its bargaining power in the negotiation.
Because no enforceable contract will be signed ex-ante, the two ﬁrms will bargain
over the surplus of the relationship after production takes place. At this point, the
ex-ante investments as well as the quality of the input are observable to both parties
and thus the costless bargaining will yield an ex-post eﬃcient outcome. I assume that
Generalized Nash Bargaining leaves the ﬁnal-good producer with a fraction φ ∈ (0,1)
of the ex-post gains from trade.
As discussed in the introduction, cost-sharing will emerge in equilibrium whenever
the bargaining power of suppliers is low. I hereafter assume that:
Assumption 1: φ > 1/2.
Following the work of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990),
and contrary to the older transaction-cost literature, I assume that integration of the
supplier does not eliminate the opportunistic behavior at the heart of the hold-up
problem. Bargaining will therefore occur even when the ﬁnal-good producer and the
supplier are integrated. Ownership, however, crucially aﬀects the distribution of ex-
post surplus through its eﬀect on each party’s outside option. More speciﬁcally, the
outside option for a ﬁnal-good producer will be diﬀerent when it owns the supplier
and when it does not. In the latter case, the amount xk(i) is owned by the supplier
and thus if the two parties fail to agree on a division of the surplus, the ﬁnal-good
producer is left with nothing. Conversely, under integration, the manager of the ﬁnal-
good producer can always ﬁre the manager of the supplying division and seize the
amount of input already produced.
If the ﬁnal-good producer could fully appropriate xk(i) under integration, there
would be no surplus to bargain over after production, and the supplier would optimally
set Lx,k(i)=0(which of course would imply xk(i)=0 ). In such case, integration
12Figure 3: Timing of Events
t0
Choice of ownership














and fixed costs in K & L
would never be chosen. To make things more interesting, I assume that by integrating
the supplier, the ﬁnal-good producer obtains the residual rights over only a fraction
δ ∈ (0,1) of the amount of xk(i) produced, so that the surplus of the relationship
remains positive even under integration. I take the fact that δ is strictly less than
one as given, but this assumption could be rationalized in a richer framework.15
On the other hand, and because the component is completely speciﬁct ot h e
ﬁnal-good producer, the outside option for the intermediate input producer is zero
regardless of ownership structure.
I nc h o o s i n gw h e t h e rt oe n t e rt h em a r k e tw i t ha ni n t e g r a t e do ras t a n d - a l o n e
supplier, the ﬁnal-good producer considers the beneﬁts and costs of integration. By
owning the supplier, the ﬁnal-good producer tilts the bargaining power in its favor
but reduces the incentives for the supplier to make an eﬃcient ex-ante investment in
labor (and perhaps capital).
I now summarize the timing of events (see also Figure 3). At t0,t h eﬁnal-good
producer decides whether it wants to enter a given market. At this point, residual
rights are assigned, the extent of cost sharing is decided, and the supplier makes a
lump-sum transfer to the ﬁnal-good producer. At t1, ﬁrms choose their investments
in capital and labor and also incur their ﬁxed costs. At t2,t h eﬁnal-good producer
15For instance, consider the following alternative set-up. Production of intermediates procedes in
two stages. When ﬁrms enter the bargaining, only a fraction δ ∈ (0,1) of xk(i) has been produced.
After the bargaining and immediately before the delivery of the input, the supplier (and only him)
can costlessly reﬁne the component, increasing the amount produced from δxk(i) to xk(i) (one could
think of this second stage as the branding of the product). Suppose, further, that the supplier does
not perform this product reﬁnement unless the two ﬁrms agree in the bargaining (this strategy is, in
fact, subgame perfect). In such case, the surplus of the relationship would also be strictly positive.
13hands the speciﬁcations of the component (and perhaps the capital stock Kx,k)t oi t s
partner, and this latter produces the intermediate input (which can be of high or low
quality). At t3, the quality of the component becomes observable and the two parties
bargain over the division of the surplus. Finally at t4,t h eﬁnal good is produced and
sold. For simplicity, I assume that agents do not discount the future between t0 and
t4.
2.2 Firm Behavior for a Given Demand
The model is solved by starting at t4 and moving backwards. I will initially assume
that ﬁnal-good producers always choose to incur the variable costs rKx,k(i) them-
selves. Below, I will show that Assumption 1 is in fact suﬃcient to ensure that this
is the case in equilibrium.
The assumption of a unit elasticity of substitution between varieties in industry
Y and Z implies that we can analyze ﬁrm behavior in each industry independently.
Consider industry Y , and suppose that at t4, nY,V pairs of integrated ﬁrms and
nY,O pairs of stand-alone ﬁrms are producing.16 Let pY,V (i) be the price charged by
an integrating ﬁnal-good producer for variety i in industry Y .L e t pY,O(i) be the
corresponding price for a non-integrating ﬁnal-good producer.










and E denotes total spending in the economy. I treat the number of ﬁr m sa sa
continuum, implying that ﬁrms take AY as given.
Integrated pairs Consider ﬁrst the problem faced by a ﬁnal-good producer and its
integrated supplier. If the latter produces a high-quality intermediate input and the
16Henceforth, a subscript V will be used to denote equilibrium values for ﬁnal-good producers
that vertically integrate their suppliers. A subscript O will be used for those that outsource the
production of the input.
14ﬁrms agree in the bargaining, the potential revenues from the sale of the ﬁnal good












On the other hand, if the parties fail to agree in the bargaining, the ﬁnal-good pro-
ducer will only be able to sell an amount δy(i), which again using (3) will translate
into sale revenues of δ
αRY(i). The ex-post opportunity cost for the supplier is zero.
The quasi-rents of the relationship are therefore (1 − δ
α)RY(i).
The contract incompleteness will give rise to renegotiation at t3. In the bargaining,
Generalized Nash bargaining leaves the ﬁnal-good division with its default option
plus a fraction φ of the quasi-rents. On the other, the integrated supplier receives the
remaining fraction 1 − φ of the quasi-rents. Since both φ and δ are assumed to be
strictly less than one, the supplier’s ex-post revenues from producing a high-quality
input are always strictly positive. Low-quality inputs will therefore never be produced
at t2.
Rolling back to t1,t h eﬁnal-good producer will therefore set its investment in
capital Kx,Y (i) to maximize φRY(i) − rKx,Y(i) where
φ = δ
α + φ(1 − δ
α) > φ.
The program yields a best-response investment Kx,Y (i) in terms of factor prices, the
l e v e lo fd e m a n da sc a p t u r e db yAY, and the investment in labor Lx,Y(i).O nt h eo t h e r





wLx,Y(i), from which an analogous reaction function Lx,Y(i) is obtained.17 Solving
for the intersection of the two best-response functions yields the equilibrium ex-ante
investments.18 Plugging these investments into (2) and (3) and rearranging, yields
17The supplier could in principle ﬁnd it optimal to complement the capital investment of the
ﬁnal-good division with some extra investment of its own, call it KS
x,Y . Nevertheless, if the two
investments in capital are perfect substitutes in production, Assumption 1 is suﬃcient to ensure that






for φ > φ > 1/2. The complementary slackness condition thus implies that
KS
x,Y =0 .



















15the following identical optimal output and price for all varieties in industry Y :














¢1−βY .( 6 )
Facing a constant elasticity of demand, the ﬁnal-good producer charges a constant
mark-up over marginal cost. The mark-up is 1/(φ
βY ¡
1 − φ
¢1−βY ) times higher than
the mark-up that would be charged if contracts were complete. From equation (6), if
βY is high, the mark-up is relatively higher, the lower is φ. Conversely, if production
of xY requires mostly labor (βY low), the mark-up is relatively higher, the higher is
φ.
Using the expressions for yV and pY,V, it is easy to check that the equilibrium
investment levels are also identical for all varieties and satisfy rKx,Y,V = αβYφpY,VyV
and wLx,Y,V = α(1 − βY)(1 − φ)pY,VyV.
At t1, the two parties also choose how much capital and labor to rent in incurring











for h ∈ {F,S}.
Finally, at t0 the supplier makes a lump-sum transfer TY,V to the ﬁnal-good pro-
ducer. As discussed above, at t0, there is a large number of potential suppliers, so
that ex-ante competition among them ensures that this transfer exactly equals the
supplier’s ex-ante proﬁts.19 Using the value of this transfer, ex-ante proﬁts for an
integrating ﬁnal-good producer can ﬁnally be expressed as
πF,V,Y =
¡






1−βY ,( 8 )
where pY,V is given in (6).
19In particular, this transfer is TY,V =( 1− φ)(1 − α(1 − βY ))AY p
−α/(1−α)
Y,V − fSrβY w1−βY .
16Pairs of stand-alone ﬁrms If the ﬁrms enter the market as stand-alone ﬁrms, the
supplier is entitled to the residual rights of control over the amount of input produced
at t2. The ex-post opportunity cost for the ﬁnal-good producer is therefore zero in
this case. As for the supplier, since the component is speciﬁct ot h eﬁnal-producer,
the value of xY(i) outside the relationship is also again zero. It follows that if the
intermediate input producer hands a component with the correct speciﬁcation, the
potential sale revenues RY(i) will entirely be quasi-rents. The ﬁnal-good producer
will obtain a fraction φ of this surplus in the bargaining, so at t1 it will choose Kx,Y(i)
to maximize φRY(i) − rKx,Y (i). On the other hand, the supplier will set Lx,Y(i) so
as to maximize (1 − φ)RY(i) − wLx,Y (i).
From here on, it is clear that the solution to the problem is completely analogous
to that for pairs of integrated ﬁrms, with φ replacing φ in equations (5) through
(8). In particular, proﬁts for a ﬁnal-good producer that chooses to outsource the
production of the intermediate input will be




1−βY ,( 9 )
where pY,O = rβY w1−βY /(αφ
βY (1 − φ)
1−βY ).
Comparison with an environment with complete contracts We can compare
the previous two situations to one in which the quantity and quality of the component
(as well the ex-ante investments) were veriﬁa b l e . I ns u c hac a s e ,t h et w op a r t i e s
would bargain over the division of the surplus upon entry and the contract would
not be renegotiated ex-post. Upon entry, the threat point for both parties would be
zero . The surplus of the relationship would thus be given by SY(i)=pY(i)y(i) −
rKx,Y (i)−wLx,Y (i)−frβY w1−βY .A tt1,t h eﬁnal-good producer would choose Kx,Y(i)
to maximize φSY(i), while the supplier would set Lx,Y(i) to maximize (1 − φ)SY(i).
It is straightforward to check that the impossibility of writing enforceable contracts
leads to underinvestment in both Kx,Y and Lx,Y. In particular, letting K∗
x,Y and
L∗
x,Y denote the optimal contractible investments, it is easy to show that K∗
x,Y >
max{Kx,Y,V,K x,Y,O} and L∗
x,Y > max{Lx,Y,V ,L x,Y,O}.20





















































Underinvestment stems from the fact that, with incomplete contracts, each ﬁrm
receives only a fraction of the marginal return to its ex-ante investment. The inef-
ﬁciency is depicted in Figure 4. The curves F ∗ and S∗ represent the reaction func-
tions K∗
x,Y(Lx,Y) and L∗
x,Y(Kx,Y) under complete contracts, with the corresponding
equilibrium in point A. Similarly, B and C depict the incomplete-contract equilibria
corresponding to integration and outsourcing, respectively. An important point to
notice from Figure 4 is that the underinvestment in labor relative to that in capital
tends to be greater under integration that under outsourcing.21 This follows from the
fact that under integration, the supplier has a relatively weaker bargaining power and
thus receives a smaller fraction of the marginal return to its ex-ante investment. A
similar argument explains why the investment in capital tends to be relatively more
ineﬃcient under outsourcing.





















that this also implies that controlling for industry characteristics, integrated suppliers should be
using a higher capital-labor ratio in production than nonintegrated ones. This is consistent with
the results of some empirical studies, discussed in Caves (1996, pp. 230-231) and Dunning (1993,
p. 296), that compare capital intensity in overseas subsidiaries of multinational ﬁrms with that of
independent domestic ﬁrms in the host country.
18The rationale for cost sharing Consider now the problem faced by an inde-
pendent supplier when the ﬁnal-good producer decides not to contribute to vari-
able costs. In such a case, the supplier chooses Kx,Y(i) and Lx,Y (i) to maximize
(1 − φ)RY(i) − rKx,Y(i) − wLx,Y(i),a n dt h eﬁnal-good producer simply receives
φRY(i) ex-post. Following similar steps as before, it is easy to show that ex-ante
proﬁts for a ﬁnal-good producer can now be expressed as








The case of an integrated supplier is completely analogous. In particular, the same
expression (10) applies with φ replacing φ.
The following result follows from comparing equation (10) with (8) and (9):
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1 (i.e., if φ > 1/2), ﬁnal-good producers will always
decide to bear the cost of renting the capital required to produce the intermediate input.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The intuition for this result is that the higher is φ, the smaller is the fraction of
the marginal return to its ex-ante investments that the supplier receives, and thus
the less it will invest in Kx,Y. This underinvestment will have a negative eﬀect on the
value of the relationship, which is what the ﬁnal-good producer maximizes ex-ante.
For a large enough φ (in this case 1/2), the detrimental eﬀect of the underinvestment
in capital is large enough so as to make it worthwhile for the ﬁnal-good producer
to bear the cost of renting Kx,Y itself, even if by doing so it now exposes itself to a
hold-up by the supplier. In other words, for φ > 1/2, a supplier incurring all variable
costs faces a too severe hold-up problem, which the ﬁnal-good producer ﬁnds optimal
to alleviate by sharing part of the required ex-ante investments.
2.3 Factor Intensity and Ownership Structure
At t0,aﬁnal-good producer in industry k = {Y,Z} chooses the ownership structure
that maximizes its ex-ante proﬁts. Comparing equations (8) and (9), it is straightfor-
ward to check that a ﬁnal-good producer will choose to integrate its supplier whenever
Θ =
πF,V,k + frβY w1−βY
πF,O,k + frβY w1−βY =
1 − α(1 − βY)+αφ(1 − 2βY)






19This inequality is more likely to hold, the lower is pY,V relative to pY,O,t h a ti s ,t h e
less distorted is the mark-up under integration relative to that under outsourcing.
Plugging the equilibrium prices and using φ = δ
α+φ(1 − δ
α), it is possible to express




α(1 − φ)δα(1 − 2βk)











An important point to notice here is that Θ(·) is not a function of factor prices.
This follows directly from the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology and isolates
the partial equilibrium decision to integrate or outsource from any potential general-
equilibrium feedbacks. This implied block-recursiveness is a useful property for solv-
ing the model sequentially, but the main results should be robust to more general
speciﬁcations for technology.22
In order to explain the pattern in Figure 1, it is central to understand how the
relative attractiveness of integration (as captured by Θ)i sa ﬀected by the capital in-
tensity in production. The following lemma states that Θ(βk,α,φ,δ) is an increasing
function of βk.
Lemma 2 The attractiveness of integration, as measured by Θ(·), increases with
the capital intensity of intermediate input production βk: ∂Θ(·)/∂βk > 0 for all
βk ∈ [0,1].
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The intuition for why Θ(βk,α,φ,δ) is increasing in βk is straightforward. The
higher the capital intensity of an industry, the more value-reducing will the under-
investment in capital be. Furthermore, as discussed above, the underinvestment in


















Θ(·) also becomes a function of the wage-rental ratio in the economy. Interestingly, for σ < 1,t h e
model predicts that, ceteris paribus, the propensity to outsource will be higher in countries with
a higher wage-rental ratio. The drawback of this generalization is that the model turns out to be
beyond the reach of paper-and-pencil analysis.
20capital tends to be more severe under integration than under outsourcing. It thus
follows that proﬁts under integration relative to those under outsourcing will tend to
be higher, the higher the capital intensity in production.23
Lemma 2 paves the way for the following central result:
Proposition 1 Given a triplet α,φ,δ ∈ (0,1), there exists a unique threshold capital
intensity b β (α,φ,δ) ∈ (0,1) such that all ﬁrms with βk < b β (α,φ,δ) choose to out-
source production of the intermediate input (i.e., Θ(βk,·) < 1), while all ﬁrms with
βk > b β (α,φ,δ) choose to integrate their suppliers (i.e., Θ(βk,·) > 1). Only ﬁrms
with capital intensity b β (α,φ,δ) are indiﬀerent between these two options.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The logic of this result lies at the heart of Grossman and Hart’s (1986) seminal
contribution. Ex-ante eﬃciency dictates that residual rights should be controlled by
the party undertaking a relatively more important investment. If production of the
intermediate input requires mostly labor, then the investment made by the ﬁnal-good
producer will be relatively small, and thus it will be optimal to assign the residual
rights of control to the supplier. Conversely, when the capital investment is important,
the ﬁnal-good producer will optimally choose to tilt the bargaining power in its favor
by obtaining these residual rights, thus giving rise to vertical integration.24
Proposition 1 advances a rationale for the ﬁrst fact identiﬁed in the introduction.
To the extent that vertical integration of suppliers occurs mostly in capital-intensive
industries, one would expect the share of intraﬁrm trade in those industries to be
relatively higher than that in labor-intensive industries. Nevertheless, Proposition
1 cannot by itself justify the trade pattern in Figure 1. An explanation of this
fact requires a proper modelling of international trade ﬂows, which I carry out in
section 3. Furthermore, the open-economy version of the model will naturally give
23Despite this clear intuition, proving that ∂Θ(·)/∂βk is positive is somewhat cumbersome (see
Appendix A.2). This is due to a counterbalancing eﬀect. Integration enhances eﬃciency in capital-
intensive industries by reducing the underinvestment problem. But this, of course, comes at the
expense of higher capital expenditures which, ceteris paribus, tend to reduce proﬁts. Lemma 2
shows, however, that this latter eﬀect is always outweighed by the former.
24The result goes through if the input is produced according to the technology in footnote 11 and
βk + η(βk)(1− βk) increases with βk. In particular, the function Θ(βk,α,φ,δ) is identical in this
more general case, so that Proposition 1 still holds for the same b β.H a v i n gt h eﬁnal-good producer
incur all capital expenditures is therefore not an important asumption.
21rise to the cross-country pattern unveiled in Figure 2. Before moving on, however, a
characterization of the general equilibrium of the closed economy is necessary.
Other comparative statics Equation (11) lends itself to other comparative
static exercises. For instance, it is possible to show that Θ(·) i sad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o n
of φ, which by the implicit function theorem implies that the cut-oﬀ b β (α,φ,δ) is
an increasing function of φ. To understand this result, notice that an increase in
φ shifts bargaining power from the supplier to the ﬁnal-good producer regardless
of ownership structure (since φ increases with φ). It thus follows that increasing φ
necessarily worsens the incentives for the supplier. To compensate for this, the ﬁnal-
good producer will now ﬁnd it proﬁtable to outsource in a larger measure of capital
intensities.
The eﬀect of α is in general ambiguous as it appears in several terms in equation
(11). Numerical analysis indicates, however, that an increase in competition (a higher
α) tends to enhance outsourcing in suﬃciently labor-intensive ﬁrms, while promoting
integration in the most capital-intensive ones. The intuition for this result is that
the higher the elasticity of substitution in demand, the more sensitive will proﬁts be
to the price charged by the ﬁnal-good producer. A natural response to an increase
in α is thus a shift towards higher eﬃciency, which translates into giving more bar-
gaining power to suppliers in labor-intensive pairs, and better incentives to ﬁnal-good
producers in capital-intensive pairs.25
Finally, an increase in δ corresponds to an increase in φ holding constant φ, i.e.,
a fall in the bargaining power of the supplier under integration. The eﬀe c to fs u c ha n
increase depends again on the capital intensity of the production process. In labor-
intensive ﬁrms the incentives of the supplier are very important and thus eﬃciency
considerations will dictate a shift towards more outsourcing in response to an increase
in δ. On the other hand, in capital-intensive ﬁrms, an increase in δ may make integra-
tion more attractive, as it now secures the more signiﬁcant investor a larger fraction
25To see where the result is coming from, ignore the ﬁr s tt e r mi n( 1 1 )a sw e l la st h ee ﬀect of α
through the terms δ





that is if β > β for some β (φ,δ,α) ∈ (0,1). Naturally, the sign of the derivative also depends on the
values of φ and δ.Is t r e s st h er o l eo ff a c t o ri n t e n s i t yh e r esince the channel is absent in other papers
that have studied the relationship between market competition and the attractiveness of outsourcing
(e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2002a, and Marin and Verdier, 2001).
22of the marginal return to its investment. Numerical analysis tends to broadly support
these intuitions.
2.4 Industry Equilibrium
In this section, I describe the partial equilibrium in a particular industry taking factor
prices as given. Again, without loss of generality, I focus on industry Y . In equilib-
rium, free entry implies that no ﬁrm makes positive expected proﬁts. In principle,
three equilibrium modes of organization are possible: (i) a mixed equilibrium with
some varieties being produced by integrated pairs and others by non-integrated pairs;
(ii) an equilibrium with pervasive integration in which no ﬁnal-good producer ﬁnds it
proﬁtable to outsource the production of the intermediate input; and (iii) an equilib-
rium with pervasive outsourcing in which no ﬁnal-good producer chooses to vertically
integrate its supplier.
The assumption that all ﬁrms in a given industry share the same capital inten-
sity greatly simpliﬁes the analysis. In particular, the following is a straightforward
corollary of Proposition 1:
Lemma 3 A mixed equilibrium in industry Y only exists in a knife-edge case, namely
when βY = b β (α,φ,δ) (i.e., Θ(βY,·)=1 ). An equilibrium with pervasive integration
in industry Y exists only if βY > b β (α,φ,δ) (i.e., Θ(βY,·) > 1). An equilibrium with
pervasive outsourcing in industry Y exists only if βY < b β (α,φ,δ) (i.e., Θ(βY,·) < 1).
Since a mixed equilibrium does not generically exist, I focus below on a charac-
terization of the two remaining types of equilibria.
Equilibrium with Pervasive Integration Consider an equilibrium in which only
integrating ﬁnal-good producers enter the market. As discussed above, the ex-ante
transfer TY,V ensures that suppliers always break even. If no ﬁnal-good producer
outsources the production of xY,a l lﬁrms will charge a price for y(i) given by equation
(6). Since nY,O =0 , equation (4) simpliﬁes to AY,V = µEp
α/(1−α)
Y,V /nY,V. On the other
hand, from equation (8), for integrating ﬁnal-good producers to make zero proﬁts,
demand must also satisfy:
AY,V =
frβY w1−βY




23It thus follows that the equilibrium number of varieties in an equilibrium with perva-
sive integration must be given by:
nY,V =
1 − α(1 − βY)+αφ(1 − 2βY)
frβY w1−βY µE.( 1 3 )
Naturally, the equilibrium number of varieties in industry Y depends positively on
total spending in the industry and negatively on ﬁxed costs. The equilibrium level of







1 − α(1 − βY)+αφ(1 − 2βY)
.( 1 4 )
Equilibrium factor demands can similarly be obtained by plugging (12) into the ex-
pressions in footnote 18.
Equilibrium with Pervasive Outsourcing Consider next an equilibrium in which
no ﬁnal-good producer vertically integrates its supplier. In such an equilibrium every
ﬁrm charges a price given by pY,O which makes equation (4) simplify to AY,O =
µEp
α/(1−α)
Y,O /nY,O. Combining this expression with the free-entry condition
AY,O =
frβY w1−βY
1 − α(1 − βY)+αφ(1 − 2βY)
p
α/(1−α)
Y,O ,( 1 5 )
yields the equilibrium number of pairs undertaking outsourcing,
nY,O =
1 − α(1 − βY)+αφ(1 − 2βY)
frβY w1−βY µE,( 1 6 )
which is identical to (13) with φ replacing φ. The equilibrium values for output
and factor demands are also analogous to those for the equilibrium with pervasive
integration.
2.5 General Equilibrium
Having described the equilibrium in a particular industry, we can now move to the
general equilibrium of the closed economy, in which income equals spending
E = rK + wL,( 1 7 )
and the product, capital and labor markets clear.
24By Walras’ law, we can focus on the equilibrium in the labor market.26 Letting LY
and LZ denote total labor demand by each pair in industries Y and Z,l a b o rm a r k e t
clearing requires nYLY + nZLZ = L. We can decompose LY into three components,
depending on the equilibrium mode of organization. In an equilibrium with pervasive
integration,
LY = Lx,Y,V + Lf,F,Y + Lf,S,Y.( 1 8 )
The ﬁrst term is the total amount of labor hired by integrated suppliers for the
manufacturing of intermediate inputs. The remaining terms are the amounts of labor
hired to cover ﬁxed costs: Lf,F,Y is the amount of labor employed in total ﬁxed costs by
ﬁnal-good producers and Lf,S,Y is the analogous demand by suppliers. From equation
(7), notice that neither Lf,F,Y nor Lf,S,Y are aﬀected by the equilibrium organization
mode.
Plugging (7) and (17) into equation (18), and substituting nY,V and Lx,Y,V for
their equilibrium values, it is possible to simplify to:
nY,VLY =( 1− βY)
¡
1 − αβY(2φ − 1)
¢ µ(rK + wL)
w
.( 1 9 )
Following the same steps, it is straightforward to show that in an equilibrium with
pervasive outsourcing,
nY,OLY =( 1− βY)(1− αβY(2φ − 1))
µ(rK + wL)
w
.( 2 0 )
Equations (19) and (20) imply that the share of income that labor receives is
sensitive to the equilibrium mode of organization. Given the assumption of Cobb-
Douglas technology, in a world of complete contracts, the share of income accruing
to labor in industry Y would be µ(1 − βY). With incomplete contracts, the share
received by labor will be larger or smaller than µ(1−βY) depending on whether φ or
φ a r es m a l l e ro rg r e a t e rt h a n1/2. Under Assumption 1, incomplete contracts tend to
bias the distribution of income towards owners of capital. Intuitively, with φ > 1/2,
the underinvestment in labor is relatively more severe. For a given supply of factors,
the relatively higher demand for capital tends to push up its price and thus its share
in total income. As is clear from equations (19) and (20), this bias is greater under
integration than under outsourcing.
26The product market has already been assumed to clear in the previous sections.
25To set the stage for an analysis of the share of intraﬁrm trade in total trade, I
make the following assumption:
Assumption 2: βY > b β > βZ.
In words, I assume that the equilibrium in industry Y is one with pervasive in-
tegration. Conversely, ﬁrms in the more labor-intensive industry Z are assumed to
outsource pervasively. It is useful to deﬁne the shares of income that accrues to capital
in each sector, which using equations (19) and (20) are given by
f βY = βY(1 + α(1 − βY)(2φ − 1))
and
f βZ = βZ (1 + α(1 − βZ)(2φ − 1)).
Notice that βY > βZ implies f βY > f βZ, and the presence of incomplete contracts does
not create factor intensity reversals. Denoting the average labor share in the economy
by σL ≡ µ(1−f βY)+(1−µ)(1−f βZ) and imposing the condition nY,VLY +nZ,OLZ = L,








,( 2 1 )
The equilibrium wage-rental ratio is a linear function of the aggregate capital-labor
ratio. This is a direct implication of the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas technology in
both industries. The factor of proportionality is equal to the average labor share in
the economy divided by the average capital share. As discussed above, Assumption
1 implies that labor shares are depressed relative to their values in a world with
complete contracts. It follows that incomplete contracts also tend to depress the
equilibrium wage-rental ratio in the economy.
3 The Multi-Country Model: Capital Abundance
and Intraﬁrm Trade
Suppose now that the closed-economy described above is split into J ≥ 2 countries,
with each country receiving an endowment Kj of capital and an endowment Lj of
labor. Factors of production are internationally immobile. Countries diﬀer only in
26their factor endowments. In particular, individuals in all J countries have identical
preferences as speciﬁed in (1) and share access to the same technology in (2). The
parameters φ and δ are also assumed to be identical everywhere. Countries are
allowed to trade intermediate inputs at zero cost. Final goods are instead assumed to
be nontradable, so that ﬁnal-good producers produce their varieties in all J countries.
To be more speciﬁc, each ﬁnal-good producer has a (costless) plant in each of the J
countries.27 Conversely, varieties of intermediates inputs will be produced in only
one location in order to exploit economies of scale. I assume that for all j ∈ J,
the capital-labor ratio Kj/Lj is not too diﬀerent from K/L,s ot h a tf a c t o rp r i c e
equalization (FPE) holds, and the equilibrium prices and aggregate allocations are
those of the integrated economy described above. Below, I derive both necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for FPE to be achieved.
This section is in three parts. I ﬁrst study the international location of pro-
duction of intermediate inputs and show how the cross-country diﬀerences in factor
endowments naturally give rise to cross-country diﬀerences in the relative number of
varieties produced in each industry. I then analyze the implied patterns of interna-
tional trade and discuss the determinants of its intraﬁrm component. Finally, I study
the robustness of the results to alternative assumptions on the tradability of ﬁnal
goods.
3.1 Pattern of Production
Because countries diﬀer only in their factor endowments, the cut-oﬀ capital intensity
b β will be identical in all countries, and by Assumption 2, suppliers in industry Y will
be vertically integrated while those in industry Z will remain non-integrated.






















































27Because ﬁnal goods are costlessly produced, the model cannot endogenously pin down where
their production is located. Assuming that they are not traded resolves this indeterminacy. In




k refers now to the number of industry k varieties of intermediate inputs
produced in country j.28 It is straightforward to check that factor demands for
each variety depend only on worldwide identical parameters and on aggregate prices,
which by assumption are also common in all countries. This implies that diﬀerences
in the production patterns between countries will be channelled through the number
of industry varieties produced in each country. In particular, using the integrated




































Combining these two expressions and plugging the equilibrium wage-rental ratio
of the integrated economy, w/r =( σL/1 − σL)K/L, yields the number of varieties of




































f βY − f βZ
´
(1 − µ)
,( 2 3 )
where nY is given by (13) and nZ by (16) with βZ replacing βY.E q u a t i o n( 2 2 )s t a t e s
that a given country j ∈ J will produce a larger measure of varieties of intermediates
in industry Y the larger its capital-labor ratio. Conversely, from equation (22), the
measure of industry-Z varieties it produces is a decreasing function of its capital-labor
ratio.




Z are increasing in the size of the
country, as measured by its share in world GDP, sj ≡ (rKj + wLj)/(rK + wL).I n
fact, it is straightforward to check that n
j
Y >s jnY if and only if Kj/Lj >K / L ,a n d
n
j
Z >s jnZ if and only if Kj/Lj <K / L . In words, capital (labor)-abundant countries
28To simplify notation, I drop all subscripts associated with the equilibrium mode of organization.
For instance, I will denote the equilibrium number of industry Y (X) varieties of intermediate inputs






























tend to produce a share of input varieties in the capital (labor)-intensive industries
that exceeds their share in world income.
For the above allocation to be consistent with FPE, it is necessary and suﬃcient
that n
j
Y > 0 and n
j
Z > 0 for all j ∈ J, i.e., that no country fully specializes in any
one sector.29 Using equations (22) and (23), this condition can be written as:






(1−f βZ)(1−σL) = κ for all j ∈ J.
It can be checked that the upper bound κ is greater than one, while the lower
bound κ is smaller than one. Assumption 3 thus requires the capital-labor ratio
Kj/Lj to be suﬃciently similar to K/L.
Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of the production pattern for the case
of two countries, the North (N) and the South (S). The graph should be familiar
29To understand necessity, notice that when factor prices depend only on world factor endowments,
the capital-labor ratio in production is ﬁxed and identical for all countries. Therefore, a given
country cannot employ all its factors by producing in only one industry except in the knife-edge
case in which its endowment of Kj and Lj exactly match that industry’s factor intensity. For a
discussion of suﬃciency, see Helpman and Krugman (1985, p. 13-14).
29to readers of Helpman and Krugman (1985). ON and OS represent the origins for
the North and the South, respectively. The vectors ONY and ONZ represent world
employment of capital and labor in industries Y and Z in the equilibrium of the
integrated economy. The set of factor endowments that satisfy Assumption 3 (i.e.,
FPE) corresponds to the set of points inside the parallelogram ONYO SZ.P o i n t E
deﬁnes the distribution of factor endowments. In the graph, the North is capital-
abundant relative to the South. Line BB0 goes through point E and has a slope of
w/r. The relative income of each country is thus held ﬁxed for all points in line BB0
and inside the FPE set.
To map this ﬁgure to the pattern of production described above, I follow Help-
man and Krugman (1985) in choosing units of measurement so that
° °ONY




° = nZz,a n d
°
°ONOS°
° = E = rK + wL.W i t h t h e ﬁrst two normal-
izations, we can graphically determine the number of varieties of intermediate in-








°. Basic geometry then implies that nN
Y >s NnY and
nN
Z <s NnZ, which is what we expected given that the North is capital abundant in
the graph.
So far I have assumed that factors of production are internationally immobile.
I therefore have not allowed ﬁnal-good producers to rent the capital stock in their
home country and export it to the country where intermediates are produced. Al-
lowing for such international factor movements would not invalidate the equilibrium
described above. In fact, by equalizing factor prices everywhere, international trade
in intermediate inputs eliminates the incentives for capital to ﬂow across countries.30
3.2 Pattern of Trade
Having described the international location of production of intermediate inputs, we
can ﬁnally move to the study of trade patterns. Since the ﬁnal good is nontradable,
the entire volume of world trade will be in intermediate inputs. Before describing
these ﬂows in more detail, we must ﬁrst confront the problem of how to value them.
30More generally, I only require that costs of capital mobility are higher than costs of trading
goods, so that international diﬀerences in rates of return are arbitraged away through trade ﬂows
rather than capital ﬂows (c.f., Mundell, 1957).
30The fact that contracts are incomplete implies that there is no explicit price for these
varieties. Because all variable costs are incurred in the country where the input is
produced, a plausible assumption is to value these intermediates at average cost. And
because the ﬁnal good is produced at no cost, the implicit price of an intermediate
input is simply pY,V in industry Y and pZ,O in industry Z.31
Without loss of generality, consider now a given country N’s imports from another
country S.C o u n t r y N will host nY + nZ plants producing ﬁnal-good varieties. Of
the nY plants in industry Y ,am e a s u r enS
Y will be importing the intermediate input
from their integrated suppliers in country S. This volume of trade will thus be
intraﬁrm trade. On the other hand, of the nZ plants in industry Z,am e a s u r enS
Z
will be importing the input from independent suppliers in country j 6= N.T h e s e
transactions will thus occur at arm’s length. Furthermore, because preferences are
homothetic and identical everywhere, consumers in country N will incur a fraction sN
of world spending on each variety. It thus follows that the total volume of N imports









S (rK + wL).( 2 4 )
Similarly, the total volume of country N exports to country S is sSsN (rK + wL),
implying that trade is balanced. Since both industries produce diﬀerentiated goods,
for a given sN + sS, the volume of bilateral trade is maximized when both countries
are of equal size (c.f., Helpman and Krugman [1985]).
Now let us look more closely at the composition of imports. Since only in in-
dustry Y do ﬁnal-good producers vertically integrate their suppliers, only imports in
this industry will occur within ﬁrm boundaries. Denoting the volume of country N
intraﬁrm imports from S by M
N,S




equilibrium value for nS






S (rK + wL)
³
1 − f βZ
´
(1 − σL) KS




f βY − f βZ
´³




´.( 2 5 )
31As suggested by a referee, intermediates could alternatively be valued according to the supplier’s




pY,V and (1− φ)pZ,O.T h i s
would reduce the value of trade ﬂows, with a disproportionate reduction in industry Y .A sar e s u l t ,
the link between factor endowments and the volume of trade established in Proposition 2 below
would be attenuated.
31Intraﬁrm imports are thus increasing in the size of both the importing and exporting
countries, and, from simple diﬀerentiation of (25), are also increasing in the capital-
labor ratio of the exporting country.
Figure 6 depicts combinations of factor endowments that yield the same volume of
intraﬁrm imports M
N,S
i−f , for the case in which there are only two countries, N and S.
The arrows in the graph point in the direction of increasing intraﬁrm imports. Point







°, implying that the line BB0 contains all points for
which sN = sS. The graph shows how for a given capital-labor ratio of the exporting
country (i.e., the South), M
N,S
i−f is maximized when the two countries are of equal size.
On the other hand, for a given relative size of the two countries, M
N,S
i−f is increasing
in the capital-labor ratio of the exporting country. In sum,
Lemma 4 For any pair of countries N,S ∈ J with S 6= N, the volume of N’s
intraﬁrm imports from S, M
N,S
i−f , is, for a given size sN of the importing country, an
increasing function of the capital-labor ratio KS/LS and the size sS of the exporting
country. Furthermore, for a given KS/LS and sS, S
N,S
i−f is also increasing in the size
sN of the importing country.
Now let S
N,S
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´.( 2 6 )
Notice that by Assumption 3, S
N,S
i−f ∈ (0,1). Furthermore, when KS/LS goes to
κ·K/L, the South stops producing varieties of intermediates in industry Y ,a n dt h u s
S
N,S
i−f goes to 0. Similarly, when KS/LS goes to κ · K/L, the South fully specializes
in industry Y , and thus S
N,S
i−f goes to 1. More importantly, simple diﬀerentiation of
(26) reveals that:
Proposition 2 For any pair of countries N,S ∈ J with S 6= N,t h es h a r eS
N,S
i−f of
intraﬁrm imports in total N’s imports from S is an increasing function of the capital-
labor ratio KS/LS of the exporting country. Furthermore, for a given KS/LS, S
N,S
i−f
is unaﬀected by the relative size of each country.


























33The ﬁrst statement is one of the key results of the paper. In particular, it shows
how in a world with international trade, the pattern of Figure 2 in the introduction
is a direct implication of the pattern in Figure 1.
Figure 7 provides a graphical illustration of Proposition 2 for the case of two
countries. Since S
N,S
i−f is uniquely determined by KS/LS, the sets of points for which
S
N,S
i−f is constant are simple straight lines from the origin of the South. The arrows
indicate that for any relative size of each country, S
N,S
i−f is increasing in KS/LS.





using data on U.S. imports. Before doing so, I brieﬂy argue that the assumption of
nontradability of the ﬁnal-good varieties is not crucial for the results derived above.
3.3 Alternative Assumptions on the Tradability of Final Goods
A. Probabilistic Location of Final-Good Production Consider the case in
which ﬁnal-good varieties can be traded, but assume that each variety is produced
in only one location.32 Let ﬁnal goods be traded only at arm’s length. Assume also
that production of these varieties is distributed across countries in a probabilistic
manner. Denote by P
j
k(i) the probability that a given ﬁnal-good variety i of industry
k is assigned to country j.L e t P
j
k(i|j0) be the same probability conditional on the
intermediate input corresponding to that variety being produced in country j0.T h e
international location of intermediate-input production is as described in section 3.1.
Consider the imports of a given country N ∈ J from another country S ∈ J.T h e s e
consist of ﬁnal-good varieties assigned to country S, as well as of intermediate inputs
required for the production of ﬁnal-good varieties assigned to N. Expected total
imports can be expressed as:



















where the ﬁrst two terms correspond to imports of ﬁnal-good varieties and the
remaining ones are imports of intermediate inputs. Of these imports, only the
third component will be traded within ﬁrm boundaries. As a benchmark, con-
sider the case in which the location of ﬁnal-good varieties is completely random and
32Imagine, for instance, that there is a negligible but positive ﬁxed cost of ﬁnal-good production.





k(i|j0)=sj. In words, the probability that a given ﬁnal-good variety is
produced in a certain country is proportional to the size of the country, but is in-
dependent of the variety, industry and location of intermediate-input production. It
is straightforward to check that, in this probabilistic framework, expected imports
are twice as large as in the previous section, i.e., MN,S =2 sNsS (rK + wL),w h i l e




YpYy. It thus follows that the share of intraﬁrm imports in
total imports will be one-half of that in equation (26). Therefore, all the claims in
Lemma 4 and Proposition 2 remain valid in this alternative set-up. This example
illustrates that in order to eliminate the prediction relating the share of intraﬁrm
imports and relative capital abundance, one needs to introduce ad hoc correlations
in the cross-country distribution of ﬁnal-good varieties.33
B. Technical Know-How and North-South Trade Consider yet an alter-
native set-up. Countries not only diﬀer in factor endowments but also in their stock
of knowledge. In particular, there is a set of countries, the North, that possess the
know-how to produce varieties of ﬁnal-goods. The remaining countries, the South, do
not have this know-how and thus export only intermediate inputs and import only
ﬁnal goods. Denote the former set by N ⊆ J and the latter by S ⊆ J.T h e ﬁnal
good is traded at arm’s length at a negligible but positive cost. Since production of
ﬁnal varieties is costless, this implies that countries belonging to N will only trade in-
termediates inputs between themselves (it follows that if S = ∅, the pattern of trade
would be identical to the one discussed above). In order to service the Southern
markets for ﬁnal goods, countries in the North will import varieties of intermediate
input in excess of the amount needed to satisfy their domestic demand. Assume that
these excess imports are not biased towards any particular industry, in the sense that
these excess imports constitute the same fraction of the exporter’s production in each
industry.
Since countries in S import only ﬁnal-good varieties, the bilateral share of intraﬁrm
imports in total imports is trivially 0 for all s ∈ S. Conversely, a given country
33For instance, if the locations of intermediate and ﬁnal-good production were perfectly correlated,
then P
j
k(i|j0)=0for all j 6= j0, and the share of intraﬁrm imports would be zero for all countries.
35n ∈ N will only import intermediate inputs. In particular, given an exporting country
j ∈ J, imports from j will be comprised of those intermediates required for domestic
consumption of ﬁnal goods and those required to service Southern countries. Denote
by ηj
n the share of j’s production that is imported to service Southern countries.
Then total imports from j will be (sn+ηj
n)sjE, with their intraﬁrm component being
(sn + ηj
n)nS
YpYy. When taking the ratio, the terms in ηn cancel, and the share of
intraﬁrm imports in total imports is again given by an expression identical to equation
(26). Conditional on the importing country belonging to N (which is surely the case
for the United States), Proposition 2 thus still remains valid. Notice also that the
total volume of intraﬁrm imports M
n,j
i−f will again increase in the capital-labor ratio
and the size of the exporting country. Furthermore, unless ηj
n is negatively correlated
w i t ht h es i z eo fc o u n t r yn, the second statement in Lemma 4 will also still apply.
4 Econometric Evidence
In this section, I use data on intraﬁrm and total U.S. imports to test more formally
the empirical validity of the main results of the paper. I start by studying more
closely the relationship between the factor intensity of the exporting industry and
the share of intraﬁrm imports in total imports. In particular, I show that the clear
correlation in Figure 1 does not seem to be driven by the omission of other relevant
variables. Next, I move on to the relationship between relative factor endowments and
the share of intraﬁrm imports. The link predicted by Proposition 2 is conﬁrmed even
after controlling for additional factors that could reasonably be expected to aﬀect this
share. Furthermore, as predicted by the theory, the size of the exporting country is
shown not to have an independent eﬀect on the share of intraﬁrm imports. Finally,
I analyze the determinants of the total volume of intraﬁrm imports and show that,
consistently with Lemma 4, total intraﬁrm imports are indeed signiﬁcantly aﬀected
by the size of the exporting country.
Before discussing the econometric results, however, the next two sections discuss
the speciﬁcations and the data I use to test the hypotheses.
364.1 Speciﬁcation
Cross-Industry Tests The ﬁrst hypothesis to test is that the share of intraﬁrm
imports is higher, the higher the capital intensity of the exporting industry. The
model presented above actually predicts that the share should be 0 for industries with
capital intensity βk below a certain threshold b β and 1 for industries with βk > b β,
a prediction that does not seem to be borne by the data. Imagine, however, that
the model provides a valid description of the world, but the statistician disaggregates
the industry data under a criterion diﬀerent from the one dictated by preferences or
technology. In particular, instead of the sectors Y and Z in the model, the statistician
disaggregates the data into M industries. Denote by n
j
Y(m) the measure of ﬁrms in
country j that produce varieties of intermediate inputs of sector Y and that are
included in industry m ∈ M by the statistician. Let n
j
Z(m) be the analogous measure
for sector Z. The statistician will report an average capital intensity in industry m














On the other hand, letting j be the rest of the world, the statistician will record




Z(m)pZz),o fw h i c h
sUSn
j
Y(m)pYy will be reported as intraﬁrm imports and sUSn
j
Z(m)pZz as imports at


















(1 − qLY/LZ)kj(m)+qKY/LZ − KZ/LZ
, (29)
where q = pZz/pYy. It is straightforward to check that the recorded share of intraﬁrm
imports in industry m ∈ M is an increasing function of the recorded average capital
intensity in that industry.35 The model can thus deliver the smooth pattern in Figure
34Id r o pt h es u p e r s c r i p tj when the theory dicates that a certain variable will be identical in all
countries. This is the case, for instance, of LY , which in the model is given by equation (18).
35In particular, S
US,j
i−f (m) increases with kj(m) as long as KY /LY >K Z/LZ, which is true in the
model since f βY > f βZ.
371.36








= θ1 + θ2 ln(K/L)m + W
0
mθ3 + ²m,( 3 0 )
where (S
US,ROW
i−f )m is industry m’s share of intraﬁrm imports in total U.S. imports
from the rest of the world, (K/L)m is the average capital-labor ratio in the exporting
industry, Wm is a vector of controls, and ²m is an error term, which is assumed to
be orthogonal to the regressors. The vector Wm is included to control for other
possible industry-speciﬁc determinants of vertical integration. Since I observe the
share (Si−f)m in four diﬀerent years, I also include industry eﬀects in some of the
regressions. In light of Proposition 1, I hypothesize that θ2 > 0.
Cross-Country Tests The second hypothesis that I test is that, in the cross-section
of countries, the share of intraﬁrm imports in total imports is higher, the higher the
capital-labor ratio of the exporting country. Equation (26) actually provides a closed-
form solution for this relationship. Denoting the importing country by US and the



















jγ4 + εj,( 3 1 )
where S
US,j
i−f is the share of intraﬁrm imports in total U.S. imports from country j,
Kj/Lj is capital-labor ratio of country j, Lj is population in country j, Wj is a vector
of controls, and ²j is an orthogonal error term. The theory predicts that γ2 should
be positive. In fact, from the log-linearization, we can derive a much more precise
prediction, i.e. γ2 =( 1− σL)σL/
³
1 − σL − f βZ
´
. This implies that the elasticity of
the share of intraﬁrm imports to the capital-labor ratio should not be lower than the
labor share in the economy. Furthermore, from the last statement in Proposition 2,
we should not expect γ3 to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
36As pointed out by a referee, the smooth pattern in Figure 1 could also be the result of idio-
syncratic preferences by ﬁrms concerning the outsourcing decision. An explicit modelling of such
ﬁrm-level heterogeneity would, however, greatly complicate the general-equilibrium analysis.













38The third test I conduct consists in running a regression analogous to (31) but
with the log of total intraﬁrm imports (instead of its share in total imports) in the


















jω4 + εj.( 3 2 )
In view of Lemma 4, both ω2 and ω3 should be positive. Furthermore, it is easy
to show that the model imposes the restrictions ω2 > γ2 and ω3 =1 .38 In words,
the total volume of intraﬁrm imports should be more responsive to the capital-labor
ratio of the exporting country than its share in total imports, while its elasticity with
respect to the size of the exporting country should be one.
4.2 Data
Dependent Variables The left-hand side variables are constructed combining data
on intraﬁrm U.S. imports and on overall U.S. imports. Intraﬁrm U.S. imports in-
clude (i) imports shipped by overseas aﬃliates to their U.S. parents; and (ii) imports
shipped to U.S. aﬃliates by their foreign parent group. The series were obtained from
the direct investment dataset available from the Bureau of Economic Activity (BEA)
website. The BEA suppresses data cells in order to avoid disclosure of individual ﬁrm
data. This limits the scope for testing the hypotheses of the paper in a fully satis-
factory manner. For reasons discussed in Appendix A.4, I end up running equation
(30) for a panel consisting of 23 manufacturing industries and four years: 1987, 1989,
1992, and 1994. As for equations (31) and (32), data availability limits the analysis
to a cross-section of 28 countries in 1992 (see Appendix A.5 for a complete list of the
industries and countries included in the regressions).
In the panel of industries, the share of intraﬁrm imports in total U.S. imports
ranges from a value slightly below 1% for textiles in 1987 to around 82% for drugs
in 1994, for an overall average of 21.2%. In the cross-section of countries, the share
38Notice that (25) can be written as M
US,j
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39ranges from an almost negligible 0.1% for Egypt up to 64.1% for Switzerland, for an
overall average of 22.4% (see Table 2).
Table 2. Share of Intraﬁrm Imports in total U.S. Imports (%)
by Industry (avg. 1987-94) by Country (1992)
DRU 65.5 FOO 13.9 CHE 64.1 ESP 15.5
OCH 40.9 PAP 12.7 SGP 55.4 AUS 15.5
VEH 39.8 FME 12.6 IRL 53.7 JPN 14.2
ELE 37.3 STO 11.8 CAN 45.1 ISR 12.4
COM 36.7 INS 11.1 NDL 42.2 HKG 11.2
CHE 35.9 TRA 10.7 MEX 41.7 PHL 8.4
CLE 35.7 PLA 9.1 PAN 35.8 ITA 8.1
RUB 23.9 PRI 6.1 GBR 33.2 ARG 5.1
AUD 23.8 LUM 4.1 DEU 31.9 COL 4.6
OEL 18.9 OMA 2.6 MYS 30.1 OAN 4.6
IMA 17.3 TEX 2.3 BEL 27.3 VEN 1.4
BEV 15.1 BRA 25.9 CHL 1.3
FRA 21.6 IDN 1.3
SWE 16.8 EGY 0.1
Note: see Appendix A.5 for a list of industries and countries.
Industry Variables Most right-hand side variables in the cross-industry regres-
sions are taken from the NBER Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database.39
Capital intensity is measured as the ratio of the total capital stock to total em-
ployment in the corresponding exporting industry.40 To control for other potential
determinants of internalization, I run equation (30) including other industry charac-
teristics one at a time. First, I allow for the possibility that the integration decision
might be determined by the human-capital intensity of the production process. To
the extent that ﬁnal-good producers also contribute to their suppliers’ costs related
to the acquisition of human capital (e.g., by ﬁnancing training programs), a model
identical to the one developed above with human capital H replacing K would in-
deed predict an eﬀect of human-capital intensity. Furthermore, if physical capital and
39The SIC classiﬁcation used in the NBER Manufacturing Database was converted to BEA in-
dustry categories using a concordance table available from the BEA and reproduced in Table A.1.
40This presupposes that U.S. industry capital intensities are similar to those in the rest of the
world. In a world with factor price equalization this would naturally be the case. In a more general
set-up, the much weaker assumption of no factor intensity reversals is suﬃcient to ensure that the
same qualitative results would be obtained by using the source country factor intensity data.
40human-capital intensity are positively correlated, the patterns in Figure 1 would then
be overstating the eﬀect of capital intensity. I measure human-capital intensity as the
ratio of nonproduction workers to production workers in a given industry, as reported
in the NBER Manufacturing dataset. A completely analogous argument could be
used to defend the inclusion of some measure of the importance of R&D and adver-
tising in the production process. R&D intensity and advertising intensity are deﬁned,
respectively, as the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales and advertising expenditures
to sales, and are obtained from a 1977 FTC survey.41 I also control for the possibility
that the integration decision may be driven by the size of scale economies at the plant
level, as measured by average capital stock per establishment.42 Finally, the decision
to integrate could also be related to the importance of suppliers’ production in the
overall value chain. A rough way of proxying for this is to control for the share of
value added in total industry sales, as reported in the NBER manufacturing dataset.
Country Variables The main right-hand side variables in equations (31) and (32),
including the capital-labor ratio of the exporting country and its total population,
are taken from the cross-section of country variables for the year 1988 constructed by
Hall and Jones (1999). In the present paper, I have adopted the view that capital
abundance is a crucial determinant of the amount of multinational activity in a given
country. Zhang and Markusen (2001) develop a model in which the volume of foreign
direct investment in a given country is instead crucially aﬀected by its skilled-labor
abundance. To control for these possible eﬀects, I include the measure of human
capital abundance reported in Hall and Jones (1999). Other authors have stressed
the importance of ﬁscal and institutional factors in determining the attractiveness of
foreign direct investment in a given country. Countries with relatively lower corporate
taxes and relatively better institutional environments should, in principle, be more
prone to hosting aﬃliates of U.S. ﬁrms. In the regressions below, I use data on
average corporate tax rates from a Price Waterhouse survey, as well as the index of
institutional quality for the year 1990 reported in Gwartney et alt. (2002). Within
41This measure has been widely used in the literature (e.g., Cohen and Klepper, 1992, Brainard,
1997).
42This variable was constructed combining the capital stock ﬁgures from the NBER dataset with
data on the number of establishments published by the U.S. Census Bureau in its County Business
Patterns series.
41the institutional factors, I also attempt to distinguish between the eﬀect of a country’s
degree of openness to FDI and that of its degree of openess to international trade.
Indices of openness to FDI and to trade are obtained from survey data reported in
the World Competitiveness Report (1992). Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for
all variables included in the regressions.
4.3 Results
Intraﬁrm Trade and Factor Intensity The top panel of Table 4 presents random
eﬀects estimates of equation (30). Column I includes no controls in the regression
and is therefore the econometric analog to Figure 1. The coeﬃcient on ln(K/L)m
is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1%-signiﬁcance level. The
estimated elasticity of the share of intraﬁrm imports with respect to the capital-
labor ratio in production implies that a 1% increase in K/L increases the share of
intraﬁrm imports by around 0.95%. Column II includes human-capital intensity in
the regression. As expected, this leads to a reduction of the estimate of θ2,w h i c h ,
however, remains highly signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on ln(H/L)m is positive but not
statistically signiﬁcant. In column III, the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales is also
included in the regression and is found to have a very signiﬁcant eﬀect on the share
of intraﬁrm imports. The estimate of θ2 in column III is lower than that implied
by Figure 1, but it still implies that a 1% increase in K/L, should lead to a 0.78%
increase in the share of intraﬁrm imports. The inclusions of advertising intensity in
column IV, of the size of economies of scale in column V, and of value-added intensity
in column VI do not overturn any of the qualitative results. None of these variables
seems to aﬀect signiﬁcantly the share of intraﬁrm imports, while capital intensity and
R&D intensity remain signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
42Table 3. Descriptive Statistics








92 -1.90 0.92 -4.74 -0.19
ln(K/L)m 92 4.26 0.57 3.21 5.73
ln(H/L)m 92 -0.69 0.60 -1.78 0.60
ln(R&D/Sales)m 92 -4.20 1.00 -6.07 -2.47
ln(ADV/Sales)m 92 -4.27 1.10 -6.63 -2.24
ln(Scale)m 92 1.63 0.92 0.06 3.48







28 -2.08 1.44 -6.67 -0.45
ln(K/L)j 28 10.54 0.86 8.13 11.59
ln(L)j 28 16.03 1.20 13.63 18.16
ln(H/L)j 28 0.82 0.19 0.47 1.10
CorpTaxj 28 0.32 0.08 0.15 0.44
EconFreedomj 28 6.36 1.22 4.19 8.24
OpFDI 26 7.83 1.23 4.73 9.57







28 6.36 2.64 -1.39 10.49
Table 4. Factor Intensity and the Share S
US,ROW
i−f








I II III IV V VI
ln(K/L)m 0.947∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗
(0.187) (0.190) (0.160) (0.162) (0.249) (0.253)
ln(H/L)m 0.369 -0.002 -0.038 -0.037 -0.081
(0.213) (0.188) (0.200) (0.206) (0.221)
ln(R&D/Sales)m 0.451∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.114) (0.128) (0.140)




ln(VA D/ Sa le s )m 0.403
(0.657)
R2 0.50 0.55 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.73
No. of obs. 92 92 92 92 92 92
Fixed Eﬀects Regressions
I II III IV V VI
ln(K/L)m 0.599∗∗ 0.610∗∗ 0.610∗∗ 0.610∗∗ 0.943∗∗ 1.058∗∗
(0.299) (0.300) (0.300) (0.300) (0.412) (0.410)
p-value Wu-Hausman test 0.14 0.27 0.62 0.64 0.52 0.19
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (*, **, and *** are 10, 5, and 1% signiﬁcance levels)
43Consistency of the random eﬀects estimates requires the industry eﬀects to be un-
correlated with the other explanatory variables. One might worry that the omission
of some relevant industry variables might lead to biases in the random eﬀects esti-
mates. As a robustness check, the bottom panel of Table 4 reports the ﬁxed eﬀects
estimates of θ2 together with the p-value of a Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity of
the industry eﬀects.43 The ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of θ2 are all signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at the 5%-signiﬁcance level. Furthermore, the point estimates are not too
diﬀerent from their random eﬀects counterparts and the null hypothesis of exogeneity
of the industry eﬀects cannot be rejected at reasonable signiﬁcance levels.
Intraﬁrm Trade and Factor Abundance Table 5 reports OLS estimates of equa-
tion (31) for the cross-section of 28 countries. The estimates in column I correspond
to the simple correlation depicted in Figure 2. The elasticity of the share of in-
traﬁrm imports with respect to the capital-labor ratio of the exporting country is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and, as predicted by the theory, the point estimate
of the elasticity is necessarily higher than any plausible labor share in the world.
Column II conﬁrms the claim in Proposition 2 that, for a given Kj/Lj,t h es i z eo f
the exporting country should not aﬀect the share S
US,j
i−f .T h ec o e ﬃcient of ln(L)j is
actually negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero. Column III introduces
the measure of human-capital abundance in the regression. Contrary to what might
have been expected (c.f., Zhang and Markusen, 2001), the estimated coeﬃcient on
ln(H/L)j is negative, although again insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Conversely,
the eﬀect of physical-capital abundance remains signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level.
As shown in column IV and V, controlling for the average corporate tax rate and
the index of institutional quality does not overturn the results. The coeﬃcients on
both CorpTaxj and on EconFreedomj are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, while
t h ee s t i m a t eo fγ2 remains signiﬁcantly positive at the 5% level. Finally, column VI
suggests that the insigniﬁcance of the institutional variable in column V might be
due to the counterbalancing eﬀects of diﬀerent policies. In particular, the share of
intraﬁrm trade is negatively aﬀected by the degree of openess to FDI but positively
43The R&D and advertising intensity variables are purely cross-sectional and are thus dropped in
the estimation. This explains that the estimates in columns II, III and IV are all identical.
44(although insigniﬁcantly) aﬀected by the degree of openess to trade. Overall, the
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the capital-labor ratio of the exporting country on the share of
intraﬁrm imports appears to be very robust.44
Table 6 presents the OLS estimates of equation (32). Columns I and II conﬁrm
that the theoretical predictions in Lemma 4 are borne by the data. Both the capital-
labor ratio of the exporting country and its size seem to have a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect on the volume of U.S. intraﬁrm imports. Consistently with the theory, the
elasticity of M
US,j
i−f with respect to Kj/Lj is estimated to be higher than the elasticity
of S
US,j
i−f with respect to Kj/Lj. Furthermore, the elasticity of M
US,j
i−f with respect
to Lj is, as predicted, not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one. As reported in columns
III and IV, controlling for human capital abundance and for the average corporate
tax rate has a negligible eﬀect on the coeﬃcients. The inclusion of the institutional
i n d e xi nc o l u m nVl e a d st oas u b s t a n t i a lf a l li nt h ee s t i m a t e de l a s t i c i t yo fi n t r a ﬁrm
imports to the capital-labor ratio, but the eﬀect remains signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Finally, column VI includes separate measures of openess to FDI and openess to
trade. The results indicate that controlling for the capital-labor ratio of the exporting
country, intraﬁrm imports are negatively aﬀected by its openness to FDI. This may
seem puzzling, but the model can shed light on this ﬁnding. Recall from section 2.3
that the attractiveness of integration is decreasing in the share φ of ex-post surplus
accruing to ﬁnal-good producers. If a higher openness to FDI corresponds to a larger
bargaining power for foreign ﬁnal-good producers, then on this account the model is
consistent with the coeﬃcient on OpFDI being signiﬁcantly negative.45 Importantly,
the eﬀect of the capital-labor in column VI continues to be signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
while the eﬀect of size is only marginally insigniﬁcant at the 10% level.
44Including OpFDI and OpTrade reduces the number of observation to 26, since no data on
these variables is available for Egypt and Panama. I re-ran the regressions in columns I, through V,
without these two countries and obtained very similar results.
45Note, however, that this is not the only eﬀect of φ on the volume of intraﬁrm imports. From
equation (25), φ also aﬀects M
US,j
i−f through the terms in f βY and f βZ which are increasing in φ,a n d
through σL, which is decreasing in φ.T h eo v e r a l le ﬀect of φ is in general ambiguous.
45Table 5. Factor Endowments and the Share S
US,j
i−f






I II III IV V VI
ln(K/L)j 1.141∗∗∗ 1.110∗∗∗ 1.244∗∗∗ 1.239∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗ 1.119∗∗
(0.289) (0.299) (0.427) (0.415) (0.501) (0.399)
ln(L)j -0.133 -0.159 -0.158 -0.142 0.017
(0.168) (0.164) (0.167) (0.170) (0.220)
ln(H/L)j -1.024 -0.890 -1.273 -0.822
(1.647) (1.491) (1.367) (1.389)








R2 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.43
No. of obs. 28 28 28 28 28 26
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis (*, **, and *** are 10, 5, and 1% sig. levels)
Table 6. Factor Endowments and the volume M
US,j
i−f






I II III IV V VI
ln(K/L)j 2.048∗∗∗ 2.192∗∗∗ 2.188∗∗∗ 2.154∗∗∗ 1.650∗∗ 2.096∗∗∗
(0.480) (0.458) (0.716) (0.663) (0.762) (0.695)
ln(L)j 0.607∗∗ 0.608∗∗ 0.614∗∗ 0.670∗∗ 0.700
(0.229) (0.268) (0.271) (0.243) (0.419)
ln(H/L)j 0.031 0.953 -0.406 0.708
(3.289) (3.316) (2.992) (3.052)








R2 0.44 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.60 0.49
No. of obs. 28 28 28 28 28 26
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis (*, **, and *** are 10, 5, and 1% sig. levels))
465 Conclusions
This paper began by unveiling two systematic patterns in the intraﬁrm component
of international trade. Traditional trade theory is silent on the boundaries of ﬁrms.
Existing contributions to the theory of the ﬁrm tend to be partial-equilibrium in
scope and have ignored the international dimensions of certain intraﬁrm transac-
tions. Building on two workhorse models in international trade and the theory of the
ﬁrm, I have developed a simple model that can account for the novel facts identiﬁed
in the introduction. By combining a Grossman-Hart-Moore view of the ﬁrm with
a Helpman-Krugman view of international trade, I have constructed a model that
determines both the pattern of international trade and the boundaries of ﬁrms in a
uniﬁed framework.
Nevertheless, much remains to be done. Future empirical investigations are likely
to unveil new distinct features of the volume of intraﬁr mt r a d et h a tc a n n o tb ea c -
counted for by the simple model developed here. On the one hand, the Grossman-
Hart-Moore theory enhances our understanding of only a subset of the determinants
of ownership structure. Holmström and Milgrom (1994) have emphasized that, in
many situations, issues related to job design and the cost of measuring performance
are more relevant when choosing between inside or outside procurement.46 It would
be interesting to investigate the implications of such a view of the ﬁrm for the volume
of intraﬁrm trade. On the other hand, in determining trade patterns, I have resorted
to a very simple trade model. Future work should help us to understand potential
channels by which technological diﬀerences, transport costs or international factor-
price diﬀerences can aﬀect the organization and location of international production.
In Antràs (2002), I have started to deal with some of these issues in a dynamic, Ri-
cardian model of North-South trade featuring endogenous product cycles as well as
endogenous organizational cycles. In particular, the model gives rise to a new version
of the product cycle, in which manufacturing is shifted to the South ﬁrst within ﬁrm
boundaries, and only at a later stage to independent ﬁrms in the South.
46Baker and Hubbard (2002) ﬁnd that ownership patterns in the trucking industry reﬂect the
relevance of each of these two strands in the literature.
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50A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Combining equations (9) and (10), it follows that regardless of the level of demand AY the
ﬁnal-good producer in a pair of stand-alone ﬁrms will decide to incur the capital expendi-
tures itself whenever:






> φ +( 1− α)(1− φ),
which holds whenever φ > 1/2.T os e et h i s ,d e ﬁne the function






− φ − (1 − α)(1− φ),















1 − α(1 − β)+αφ(1 − 2β)




The ﬁrst term is clearly positive when φ > 1/2. Furthermore, since
(1−α(1−β)+αφ(1−2β))
(1−α)(1−φ)φ
increases with α, it follows that
(1−α(1−β)+αφ(1−2β))
(1−α)(1−φ)φ − 2 ≥ 1
(1−φ)φ − 2 > 0 and the second
term is also positive. Hence, H(φ) > 0 for all φ > 1/2.S i n c eφ > φ, as long as φ > 1/2,
ﬁnal-good producers in integrated pairs will also decide to rent the capital stock and hand
it to the supplier. QED.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2







> (2 − α)(1− α)(1− φ)δα
where Ω(βk)=
¡
1 − α(1 − φ)+αβk(1 − 2φ)
¢
(1 − α(1 − φ)+αβk(1 − 2φ)) and remember
that φ = δα + φ(1 − δα). Now notice that if φ > φ ≥ 1/2 then Ω0(βk) < 0 ∀βk ∈ [0,1],a n d
if φ < φ ≤ 1/2,t h e nΩ0(βk) > 0 ∀βk ∈ [0,1].F u r t h e r m o r e ,i fφ > 1/2 > φ,t h e nΩ
00
(βk) < 0
∀βk ∈ [0,1]. It thus follows that Ω(βk) ≥ min{Ω(0),Ω(1)}. Without loss of generality,
assume that Ω(1) = (1−αφ)(1−α(φ +( 1− φ)δα) < Ω(0) (the case Ω(1) > Ω(0) is entirely








(2 − α)(1− α)(1− φ)δα
(1 − αφ)(1 − α(φ +(1− φ)δα)
From simple diﬀerentiation of this expression, it follows that ϑ0 (δ) > 0 if and only if
(1 − αρ)2 − (2 − α)(1− α)(1− ρ)ρ > 0 for some ρ ∈ (0,1). But it is simple to check that
this is in fact true all α,ρ ∈ (0,1), and therefore ϑ(δ) > ϑ(0) = 0. Notice that Assumption
1 is not necessary for this result. QED.
51A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
From equation (11) and the deﬁnition of φ, note that we can write
Θ(0,·)=
1 − α(1 − φ)

















The inequalities follow from φ > φ and the fact that (1−αx)x
α
1−α is an increasing function
of x for α ∈ (0,1) and x ∈ (0,1). The rest of the Proposition is a direct implication of
Lemma 2. QED.
A.4 Data Appendix
This Appendix discusses in more detail the construction of the share of intraﬁrm imports
in total U.S. imports. Intraﬁrm imports were obtained from the “Financial and Operating
Data” on multinational ﬁrms downloadable from the BEA website. Since in the model
ownership is associated with control, I restricted the sample to majority-owned aﬃliates.
As discussed in the main text, the BEA suppresses data cells in order to avoid disclosure of
individual ﬁrm data. The unsuppressed data is only available to researchers aﬃliated to the
BEA. Unfortunately, one of the requirements for aﬃliation is being a U.S. citizen (which I
am not).
To construct intraﬁrm imports by industry, I combine data from foreign aﬃliates of U.S.
ﬁrms and U.S. aﬃliates of foreign ﬁrms. Intraﬁrm imports comprise (i) imports shipped by
overseas aﬃliates to their U.S. parents, by industry of aﬃliate, and; (ii) imports shipped
to U.S. aﬃliates by their foreign parent group, by industry of aﬃliate.47,48.T h e s u m o f
these two elements was constructed at the ﬁnest level of disaggregation available, focusing
on manufacturing industries and excluding natural-resource industries (in particular, pe-
troleum, ferrous metals and non-ferrous metals).49 I also restricted the sample to years in
which benchmark surveys were conducted. Overall, I end up with 23 industries and four
years: 1987, 1989, 1992 and 1994.
To construct intraﬁrm imports by country, I add up (i) imports shipped by overseas af-
ﬁliates to their U.S. parents, by country of origin, and (ii) imports shipped to U.S. aﬃliates
47The BEA deﬁnes a foreign parent group as consisting of (1) the foreign parent, (2) any foreign
person, proceeding up the foreign parent’s ownership chain, that owns more than 50 percent of the
person below it, up to and including the ultimate beneﬁcial owner, and (3) any foreign person,
proceeding down the ownership chain(s) of each of these members, that is owned more than 50
percent by the person above it.
48The conceptually correct disaggregation for case (ii) would have been by the industry of the
exporter (i.e. of the foreign parent group). Unfortunately, these series are not available. Intraﬁrm
imports of type (i) constitute, however, more than two-thirds of all intraﬁrm imports. More im-
portantly, a similar pattern to that in Figure 1 emerges when the analysis is restricted to intraﬁrm
imports of type (i).
49Patterns of ownership in natural-resource sectors are likely to be determined by factors, such as
national sovereignty, from which I abstract in the model.
52by their foreign parent group, by country of origin. In both cases, I restrict the analysis to
manufacturing industries, although in this case it was impossible to remove those transac-
tions involving natural resources (this might explain why intraﬁrm imports from Chile and
Venezuela are lower than predicted in Figure 2). The BEA performs two types of manipu-
lations to the data. Apart from suppressing cells to avoid disclosure of data of individual
companies, it also assigns a unique symbol to trade ﬂows inferior in value to $500,000. I
assign a value of $250,000 to these cells.50 Overall, I end up with a single cross-section
with 28 countries in 1992. All the other benchmark survey years lack at least one of the
components of intraﬁrm imports.
Finally, in order to compute the share of intraﬁrm imports, I construct total U.S. imports
by industry and year, and then by country of origin, using data put together by Robert
Feenstra and available from the NBER website. Import ﬁgures correspond to their c.i.f.
values. Feenstra’s four-digit industry classiﬁcation was matched to the 23 BEA industries
using a conversion table available from BEA and reproduced in Table A.1.
As pointed out by a referee, a signiﬁc a n tp o r t i o no fi n t r a ﬁrm trade involves ﬁnal goods
that are shipped from a manufacturing plant to an overseas wholesale aﬃliate which then
distributes the good in the foreign country. Unfortunately, the BEA dataset does not
distinguish between imports of intermediate inputs and imports of ﬁnal goods, so that the
latter cannot be substracted from intraﬁrm imports. As pointed out by the same referee,
however, this is not necessarily a problem for the empirical work as an analogous theoretical
model can also be interpreted in the context of a supplier-distributor relationship.
50This is only done for two observations. The results are robust to imputing alternative values
between 0 and $500,000.
53A.5 Additional Tables
Table A.1. Industry Description and Classiﬁcation
Code Description Corresponding Industry
SIC Classiﬁcation
BEV Beverages 208
FOO Other food and kindred products 201-207, 209
CHE Industrial chemicals and synthetics 281, 282, 286
DRU Drugs 283
CLE Soap, cleaners and toilet goods 284
OCH Other chemical products 285, 287, 289
FME Fabricated metal products 341-349
COM Computer and oﬃce equipment 357
IMA Other industrial machinery and equipment 351-356, 358, 359
AUD Audio, video and communications equipment 365, 366
ELE Electronic components and accessories 367
OEL Other electronic and electrical machinery 361-364, 369
TEX Textile products and apparel 221-229, 231-39
LUM Lumber, wood, furniture and ﬁxtures 241-49, 251-59
PAP Paper and allied products 261-263, 265, 267
PRI Printing and publishing 271-279
RUB Rubber products 301, 302, 305, 306
PLA Miscellaneous plastics products 308
STO Stone, clay, and glass product 321-29
VEH Motor vehicles and equipment 371
TRA Other transportation equipment 372-376, 379
INS Instruments and related products 381, 382, 384-387
OMA Other manufacturing 211-19, 311-19, 391-99
Table A.2. Country Codes
Code Country Code Country
ARG Argentina IDN Indonesia
AUS Australia IRL Ireland
BEL Belgium ISR Israel
BRA Brazil ITA Italy
CAN Canada JPN Japan
CHE Switzerland OAN Taiwan
CHL Chile PAN Panama
COL Colombia PHL Philippines
DEU Germany MEX Mexico
EGY Egypt MYS Malaysia
ESP Spain NDL Netherlands
FRA France SGP Singapore
GBR United Kingdom SWE Sweden
HKG Hong Kong VEN Venezuela
54